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BOOK REVIEWS

Epistemic Justification, by Richard Swinburne. Clarendon Press, 2001. Pp.
viii,262. $65.00 (hardback), $15.99 (paperback).
JOHN GRECO, Fordham University
Richard Swinburne tells us that his book has two major concerns. The
first is to explicate what it is for a belief to be justified, or (equivalently)
what it is for someone to be justified at a certain time in holding some
belief. The second is to explain the difference between mere true belief
and knowledge. Regarding the first issue, Swinburne follows William
Alston in holding that there is no univocal concept of epistemic justification. Rather, different epistemologists treat different senses of justification. The question that becomes important, then, is which kinds of justification are worth having. Regarding the second issue, Swinburne does
Alston one better, endorsing an analogous pluralism about the concept
of knowledge. "There are ... different kinds of warrant, and so of
knowledge" (p. 4). Again, the salient question becomes what kinds of
knowledge are worth having. An important distinction for Swinburne is
that between synchronic justification (what it is for a belief to be a justified response to the situation in which a believer finds herself at a given
time) and diachronic justification (what it is for a synchronically justified
belief to be based on adequate investigation). Other important distinctions regard the different senses in which a belief can be "probable," and
the different senses in which a belief can be "based" on its evidence.
These distinctions, in turn, lead to different kinds of internalist and
externalist justification.
Although various kinds of justification are distinguished, a focus is on
what Swinburne calls "synchronic objective internalist justification." A
belief is justified in this sense just in case "it is rendered logically probable by the subject's rightly basic beliefs ... and based on the latter, both
in the sense of being caused by them and in the senses that the subject
believes that it is caused by them and renders them [sic.] (logically)
probable" (p. 158). A belief that is justified in this sense, Swinburne
explains, is "the consciously rational response to evidence in the form of
basic beliefs that would be made by a logically omniscient being" (p.
158). According to Swinburne, this sort of justification has both instruFAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
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mental and intrinsic value: beliefs that are justified in this sense are
objectively likely to be true, and are valuable in their own right, even if
not true. On the other hand, no kind of external justification has intrinsic value. Externalist justification is of instrumental value only (pp.
163-4). When Swinburne investigates diachronic justification he reaches
similar conclusions. "There is no intrinsic value in a subject pursuing a
course of investigation that as a matter of fact usually leads to better justified beliefs, unless the subject believes that this kind of investigation
usually does have this result and is pursuing it for that reason" (p. 185).
On the other hand, "we value diachronic objective internalist justification for its own sake" (p. 185).
One helpful feature of the book is that it is divided between a main
body of text and several additional notes at the end of the book. These
additional notes and an appendix explore special issues (usually in
probability theory) that will be of more interest to the expert than to the
average undergraduate taking a course in epistemology. There are some
unusual features as well. For example, chapter two is a long discussion
about the nature of belief, even though Swinburne admits that the views
presented there are not of central concern to a book on epistemic justification (pp. 52, n14; 55). Similarly, many of the additional notes treat
problems that are not clearly epistemological. These include discussions
about decision theory, randomness, the status of laws of nature, and
computational accounts of simplicity. The book also contains short (and
to my mind inadequate) discussions of contextualism and virtue theory.
All of these features can be traced to Swinburne's Bayesian approach to
epistemology. Within that approach, some issues that are commonly
considered to be of central importance become marginal, while issues
associated with probability theory take pride of place.
Swinburne's version of this approach requires that all contingent
propositions have an a priori, intrinsic probability. It also requires that
there are objective, a priori relations of support between any two propositions; that is, a measure of support "quite independent of other facts
about the objects referred to in those propositions" (p. 64). Many
philosophers will balk at these assumptions, and Swinburne does little
to allay their worries. As far as I can see, his only argument for the
assumptions is that they are required for rational inquiry. Here is a typical passage.
If science is really a rational enterprise in the sense that certain evidence really does make one hypothesis more probable and another
hypothesis less probable, and so there are indeed correct criteria of
inductive inference, ... there must be principles of probability
additional to the Bayesian axioms, and in particular a priori principles for ascribing intrinsic probabilities .... But if there are no such
a priori criteria, we should give up studying science, history, and
every other subject of university study. For no one will be able to
produce evidence that others can correctly recognize as making
one hypothesis in the field more probable than any of an infinite
number of rivals; and no retrodiction or prediction as any more
probable than any other (p. 122).
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The implicit argument can be reconstructed as follows:
Rational inquiry is possible only if there are a priori criteria for
ascribing intrinsic probabilities.
Rational inquiry is possible
Therefore,
There are such criteria.
This argument would be a good one if both its premises were acceptable, but what reason do we have for accepting the first premise? Many
philosophers will think that there are clear alternatives. One that comes
to mind is that contingent propositions have no a priori or intrinsic
probability. Rather, their epistemic status is entirely a function of contingent features of the knower and her environment. For example, the
epistemic status of perceptual beliefs is a function of contingent features
of the perceiver and of the perceptual situation. Likewise, there are no
(or few) necessary or a priori relations of support between contingent
propositions. Rather, evidence relations are a function of contingent features of the reasoner, together with contingent facts about what is a reliable indication of what. On this view, there would be "correct criteria of
inductive inference," but these would be tied to contingent features of
human cognition and of the actual world, as opposed to a priori facts
about intrinsic probabilities. Given the current popularity of such a
view, one would like to see Swinburne say more about it.
In summary, Swinburne has provided us with a clearly written, welldeveloped version of a Bayesian approach to epistemology. The book
explores many issues that are relevant to such an approach, while
spending less time with others that would typically get more attention
in an introduction to epistemology. Accordingly, readers who want to
learn more about Bayesianism in epistemology, or who want to explore
relevant issues more deeply, will be well served by this book. Those
who come to the book with doubts about that approach, or about
Swinburne's version of it, might be less satisfied.

The Impossibility of God, edited by Michael Martin and Ricki Monnier.
Prometheus Books, 2003. Pp. 438. $32.00.
FRANK B. DILLEY, University of Delaware (Emeritus)
This is a remarkable collection of articles. Some atheists have argued
that the concept of God is meaningless, and others have argued that
God's existence is improbable, but the editors of this collection say that
they have gathered articles which argue that the existence of God is logically impossible, impossible in the same sense in which round squares
are impossible. The editors helpfully introduce each section of the book,
providing a summary of the central thesis of each individual paper, but

